



Abstract. The maxim to understand the law literally (Montesquieu, Voltaire)
resembles Holmes’ Plain Meaning Approach. But these approaches should not be
considered as the expression of a naïve legal epistemology. They rather stress that
the law ought to be interpreted as it is understood by the prudent citizen. In this
way, the ideal of the rule of law is best guaranteed.
1. Introduction
If we reflect upon the amenities of our legal system, that is, the Dutch legal
system, especially in contrast with those in dictatorially governed coun-
tries, we will probably mention some principles that most of us consider
to be the pillars of Western legal systems, but which are unveiled in legal
literature as myths, ideologies, or pious frauds. I allude to legal principles
like the Trias Politica, equality, and accessibility. The separation of powers
is considered to be extremely important to safeguard the rule of law, but
in practice the walls between the legislator, executive and judiciary turn
out to be extremely porous. The principle of equality is another principle
that is supposed to be at the heart of our legal system, but as feminist
analyses of law have shown, sometimes inequality is embedded in the
law itself. And although all citizens have equal access to the judiciary, it is
not necessary to be a sociologist to realize that all kinds of barriers of a
financial and social character exist that account for the phenomenon that,
in the republic of equals, some are more equal than others.
In this paper I would like to focus on one aspect of the Trias Politica—the
judge’s binding to the law. This principle, although self-evident at first
sight, turns out to be a highly contested one. Some schools of legal thought,
such as Legal Realism or the Critical Legal Studies Movement, consider
this principle as a mere myth that serves the interests of the privileged
classes; less radical movements take pains to align this principle with the
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strong discretion the judge exercises when interpreting the law, so that the
judge is said to be bound by the law even when his decision is contrary
to its regulations.
2. Binding to the Law: The Words
The binding to the words seems to best guarantee that the judge is tied
down to the law. This is, no doubt, the idea of the ambitious codifications
of the nineteenth century as much as current legislation. The relevance of
the exact wording is indicated by the care with which the laws are usually
drafted—in this respect, the adoption of the Dutch Civil Code, which had
been labored on for more then 40 years, is exemplary. The legislator seeks
to arrive at standards that are as precise as possible, narrowing down the
possible wordings in order to offer the citizen legal certainty and the judge
clear standards for the adjudication of disputes. Clear, plain, and precise
statutes, says Voltaire, reduce the number of cases in which the judge has
to interpret—and interpreting, continues Voltaire, is nearly always corrupt-
ing (Voltaire 1962). And it was Montesquieu who famously stated that
the judges are nothing but the mouth that pronounces the words of the
law, mere passive beings, incapable of moderating either its force or rigor
(Montesquieu 1979, 301). Their judgments ought to be fixed to such a
degree as to always comply with the letter of the law.
The idea is that to be bound by the law is to be bound by the words of
the law. This is not the opinion of just two men, not even of two famous
philosophers, but the opinion of an era. The political ideas of Montesquieu,
especially his doctrine of the Separation of Powers, were rigidly enforced
after the French Revolution in 1789. The courts, for example, were not
allowed to interpret the law: In case of doubt, they had to refer to the
legislator (the référé legislatif ), from 1791 to the Tribunal de Cassation, an
organ of the legislator. Similar institutions existed in Austria, Prussia, and
some other German states.1
These opinions are, as we know, passées. From the critique of legalism,
a critique that is nowadays generally accepted, emerges the image of
ideologically driven legal theorists and politicians on the one hand, and
hopeless naive theorists on the other. Ideologically driven, because the
project of the judge as bouche de la loi perfectly suited the striving for a
liberal state, in which the state’s power—the judiciary included—would be
confined to the bare minimum. And hopeless naive, because a single
1 The Constitution of 1791, title III, Ch. V, articles 19 and 21, formally abolished in 1828. See
also the Decree of April 14, 1780 of Frederick II of Prussia, which forbade interpretation of the
laws; furthermore article 13 of the Code of 1786 of Joseph II of Austria, which introduced a
référé legislatif if the judges were in doubt about the meaning of a law; and the Bavarian
Instruction of October 19, 1813, forbidding officials and scholars from writing a commentary
on the Bavarian penal code.
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reflection on the nature of legal adjudication immediately reveals that a
literal application of the law does not make sense at all. Words can only be
understood in context—that is, the words of the law in the context of a
provision, the provision in connection with the entire statute, and the
statute in connection with related regulations, whereas the law itself cannot
be comprehended apart from previous and current political and social
conditions. Critics of legalism argued that, in order to determine the
meaning of the law, we necessarily make use of both the objective and
subjective method, that is, we refer to the meaning the words have in
common parlance, as well as to legislative intent. Both methods, in turn,
refer to different methods of interpretation. But these methods do not
possess a clear hierarchy and therefore allow the judge to use discretion—a
discretion that the legalists had sought to expel, demanding that the judge
literally apply the law (Scholten 1974, 33–6).
This criticism of legalism is widespread and belongs to the common
opinion of most academic lawyers nowadays. In The Problems of Jurispru-
dence, Richard Posner equates the ideal of grammatical interpretation or the
so-called Plain Meaning Approach with the outdated idea of mechanical
jurisprudence (Posner 1990, 262). One of the proponents of the Plain
Meaning Approach, Oliver Wendell Holmes, argued that to determine the
meaning of a statute, we must not ask what the legislator meant, but what
the words of the statute would mean in the mouth of a normal speaker,
using them in the circumstances in which they were used.
According to Posner, this device is meaningless, for it is not clear who
this “normal speaker” is: Is the normal speaker just an ordinary individual
or is it a specific group (e.g., officials, commerce)? Another objection is that
the Plain Meaning Approach is unable to solve external ambiguities, that
is, ambiguities due to circumstances not taken into account at the time of
the legislation. At the time of the enactment, for example, the word “press”
referred to print media only, a meaning that seems incongruous in light of
modern methods of disseminating news and opinion (Posner 1990, 263).
Posner’s objections to the Plain Meaning Approach are so obvious that its
proponents must have been desperately naive.
And yet . . . it is difficult to picture the author of the Lettres persanes as a
naive mind, not to mention the fiery Voltaire. Oliver Wendell Holmes can
be criticized for his radical skepticism rather than for intellectual naivety.
And commonsensical lawyers of the first rank, like G. J. Wiarda, former
president of the Dutch Supreme Court, hold that in the relatively rare cases
in which the law is not clear, interpretation starts with disinterestedly
listening and asking, that is, comprehending as well as possible the purport
of the regulation, something that, according to Wiarda, comes close to
linguistic interpretation (Wiarda 1988, 22).
I suspect that this image of the heuristics of the judge corresponds to the
image that most non-lawyers hold of the working methods of the judge:
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that, if the legislator has applied certain words, the judge has to ask herself
which words the normal speaker would have used, if this normal speaker
had been in the same position as the legislator. For if the judge is entitled
to interpret the law differently from the way an ordinary citizen would
understand the words, then why bother about the law at all? The judiciary,
then, seems to be allowed to ascribe to the law any purpose whatsoever,
which is a different way of saying that the judge is lui-même la règle
and, therefore, a despot. If the law is binding—and nobody seriously
challenges this premise—isn’t this primarily by the wording? And if this
is correct, why is linguistic interpretation in such disrepute? And why has
the Plain Meaning Approach ended up on the shambles of intellectual
ideas?
3. Acceptable and Unacceptable Literal Readings of the Law
If the Plain Meaning Approach means that the judge has to take the words
of the law literally, it is plain that this approach does not make sense at all.
For this directive allows for a multitude of possible readings, without a
clue about which one should be chosen. A glance at a dictionary suffices
to reveal that most words possess different meanings. It is only in the
context of a text or provision that it becomes clear in which sense the
words have to be understood. Thanks to this context, says Holmes, their
meaning is even more refined than any given in the wordbook (Holmes
1992, 297).
To interpret the words “to the letter,” therefore, necessarily refers to
systematic interpretation: The individual words take on their meaning
from the provision, the provision from the regulation of which it is part,
and so on. This is one of the objections against the legalist’s claim that
linguistic interpretation is supposed to have priority above all others. To
refer to one method of interpretation is to refer to many: Just as linguistic
interpretation refers to systematic interpretation, systematic interpretation,
in turn, refers to others: to legislative intent and legal history, for example,
and these to evolutionary interpretation, and so on.
An example from legal practice might evince this thesis. In its ruling of
October 19, 1990, the Dutch Supreme Court rejected an alleged literal
reading of Article 33 of Book I of the Dutch Civil Code (an article that was
repealed some years after the case). The plaintiffs argued that the Civil
Code nowhere explicitly states that a marriage between two persons of the
same sex is disallowed. Article 33 stated: “A man can only be married with
a woman, a woman can only be married with a man.” Up till this case, this
article was usually understood to prohibit polygamy, so that it could be
read as follows: that a man can only be married with one woman, and a
woman can only be married with one man. In this respect, the plaintiffs
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argued, neither this article, nor the Civil Code, excludes a marriage
between two persons of the same sex. The Supreme Court nevertheless
rejected this interpretation:
[This reading] departs from a literal reading of several sections, a reading that is
already contestable as such, and ignores the law’s purport as the legislator, taking
into account the preceding legislation, had in mind when establishing Book 1 Civil
Code. Even when the social developments afterwards advance the opinion that the
legal ban on a lawful marriage between two women or two men is no longer
justified, this would not legitimize a reading that deviates from the unequivocal
tenor of the law, all the more because marriage is a matter of public order and asks
for legal certainty.
This paragraph is of interest for two reasons. First of all, it demonstrates
that one has to make use of different methods of interpretation in corre-
lation in order to determine the meaning of a provision. The Supreme
Court rejects the interpretation of the plaintiffs, based as it is solely on a
literal reading, for this interpretation ignores the unmistakable tenor of the
law. The law’s tenor is inferred from legislative intent (“the law’s purport
as the legislator envisaged when establishing Book 1 Civil Code”), con-
ceived in light of the preceding legislation. This legislation, in turn, lends
itself to several modes of interpretation, because to determine the meaning
of obsolete legislation elicits similar modes of interpretation to the inter-
pretation of valid law.
This paragraph is of interest for another reason: The Supreme Court rejects
the alleged “literal reading” of the plaintiffs (“It departs from a literal
reading of several sections, a reading that is already contestable as such
[. . .]”). But what exactly is meant by a literal reading and why is this
contestable as such? On close inspection, at least two alleged literal readings
of this article are possible. The first one is the reading the plaintiffs
contended and the Supreme Court repudiated, and comprehends the article,
in accordance with the standard reading, as the expression of the prohibition
of polygamy. In this reading, the emphasis is on the numerals: “A man can
only be married with one woman, a woman can only be married with one
man.” But Article 33 can be read differently “to the letter,” a reading that
highlights both numerals and the objects of the presupposition: “A man can
only be married with a woman, a woman can only be married with a man.”
It is this reading of Article 33 that the Supreme Court decided to be the
correct one, at least in the case at hand. But this reading is also “to the letter,”
although one that dissents from its standard interpretation. What is the
difference between the first and the second literal reading?
The difference is that the plaintiff’s contention rests on just one argu-
ment, the argument that the law nowhere explicitly expresses a ban on
same-sex marriage, not even in the above-mentioned Article 33. This is
correct, the Supreme Court admitted, but the explanation for an existing
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ban on same-sex marriage, though not explicitly pronounced, is that, at the
time of the enactment, the legislator—and not just the legislator, one may
add—considered it self-evident that a marriage could exist between
persons of different sex only. The plaintiff’s reading of the provision fails
to appreciate this basic assumption, as it rests solely on the words and
neglects all sorts of counter-indications, like legal history, that challenge
this reading.
If this analysis is correct, then an appeal to the letter of the law—
linguistic interpretation—is, as a method of legal interpretation, not con-
testable as such. It is contestable as far as it leads to a result, contrary to
what is conceived of as the unequivocal tenor of the law.
4. Linguistic Interpretation versus the “Plain Meaning Approach”
It seems that we can distinguish between two varieties of linguistic
interpretation, one that results in acceptable interpretations, and one that
produces insupportable ones. The plaintiff’s reading meets with the con-
ception of what is conceived of as linguistic interpretation in legal theory:
a reading of the provision that takes into consideration only the meaning
of the words itself, not its legal and social context. If we compare it to the
plaintiff’s reading of article 33, Book 1 Civil Code, the Supreme Court’s
reading strongly resembles the “Plain Meaning Approach” of Holmes,
though the Court did not invoke the normal speaker as warrant, but
the legislator. Holmes would have said that, although the words of the
provision do not prohibit a marriage between man and man or between
woman and woman, it will not be read as such by the normal speaker.
Posner rightly points out that the law exhibits a multitude of ambiguities
that cannot be solved properly without knowledge of the circumstances
that account for the form and content of the law at hand, but he mistakenly
takes the Plain Meaning Approach to be inadequate in this respect. The
Plain Meaning Approach does not demand: “Attribute a meaning to the
provision that is conformable to the letter of the law apart from its social
context,” but requires: “Ask yourself, when interpreting the law, what the
normal speaker would have meant, if he would have framed this provision
under the same circumstances in which the legislator used those words,”
(Holmes 1992, 297), that is: Take into consideration the social opinions,
beliefs, and values that resonate in those words when used by the normal
speaker at the time of the enactment.
This we know for sure: that the wordings of the provisions concerning
marriage in general, and the wordings of Article 33 of Book I Civil Code
in particular, would not have been chosen by the normal speaker, if (s)he
had intended to state that a marriage between man and man, or woman
and woman, should also have been a legal possibility. And we can be sure
of this, because legislation, jurisprudence, and social opinions at the time
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of the legislation indisputably reveal that the conception of matrimony,
construed as an association between man and woman only, was the
expression of the dominant ideological discourse of that time. It is this
ideology, therefore, that serves as the unequivocal context in light of which
the provision has to be understood, excluding the plaintiff’s literal reading.
The difference between Holmes and the Supreme Court is a difference of
perspective. Holmes focuses on the ordinary citizen, the Supreme Court on
the legislator. But in this respect citizen and legislator are interchangeable.
In both perspectives it is not a real person or the real legislator that serves
as standard, but the prudent citizen or prudent legislator.
5. Methods of Interpretation and the Law’s Tenor
That judge’s binding to the letter of the law, therefore, does not mean that
the judge interprets the law literally—an approach that, as we mentioned
before, makes no sense at all. It means that the law has to be understood
as it was reasonably understood by the normal speaker at the time of the
enactment. To determine the context of the normal speaker, one has to
make use of those perspectives that are known in legal theory as methods
of interpretation. Used together and in correlation, these methods lead to
the alleged tenor of the provision. In order to determine how the provision
is understood by the normal speaker, we might make use of linguistic
interpretation—admissibility or inadmissibility of the alleged literal
reading depends on whether or not the interpretation is supported by
different viewpoints on which one may resort to settle the law’s meaning.
It is this criterion of mutual underpinning that explains why linguistic
interpretation sometimes fails, as in the above-mentioned case of a mar-
riage between persons of the same sex, and sometimes succeeds, as in the
ruling of the Dutch Supreme Court on the interpretation of the word
“finding” in the (legal) provision concerning the legal obligation to assign
a finder’s reward whenever abandoned property is restituted to the owner
(HR 25 October 1996, NJ 1996, 16).
Here are the facts of the case: A stolen car had been found by a company,
called Graphé, that professionally tracks down missing cars. As such,
Graphé claimed a finder’s reward according to section 10, paragraph 2 of
Book V Civil Code, which states: “The finder who satisfies his liabilities
is entitled to an equitable reward.” The insurance company, to which the
property of the stolen car had been transferred, contested this claim,
arguing among others that the provision does not apply in this situation.
According to the insurance company, the word “finder” in the provision
has to be conceived as “finder by chance,” as the purpose of the provision
would be to reward only the true finder. Since Graphé was a company that
professionally traces down missing cars, Graphé could not be deemed to
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be “true finder” and should not therefore be entitled to the finder’s reward.
The Supreme Court threw the objection out in two steps:
The tenor of Article 5:5 ff. Civil Code can be summarized this way: that the
provision aims to advance the recovery of lost property whenever it is lost, and, in
case it turns out that the person who lost it does not show up, to find a solution
to facilitate the recurrence or actual use of this property in judicial matters as
soon as possible. In this respect, a broad interpretation of the word “finding,”
corresponding to the linguistic meaning of “finding,” squares with the provisional
intention.
What makes the Supreme Court think that the tenor of this provision is
as stated? The Conclusion of the Advocate-General might provide some
elucidation, for the Supreme Court’s ruling is published together with the
Conclusion of the Advocate-General, the latter serving as a repository of
arguments that support or complement the Court’s argumentation. In this
case, Advocate-General Hartkamp offers some arguments in favor of
linguistic interpretation.
After discussing thoroughly the treatment of the case in the previous
courts and the claimant’s grievances, he considers, first of all, the griev-
ance that interests us here: that professionally tracing down missing cars
can never be qualified as “finding” in the context of the provision. This
complaint is dismissed by Hartkamp on several grounds. He primarily
rejects the complaint with an appeal to legal history, and combines
this argument drawing on the ordinary meaning of the word “finding”
(linguistic argument) and adding a consequentialist argument. He argues
that the original enactment holds a definition of “finder” that does not
comprise any clues to the intentions of the finder whatsoever. This view-
point squares with the ordinary meaning of the word “finding,” which
also denotes the act of deliberatively searching for an object. According
to Hartkamp, this viewpoint also corresponds with legislative intent. The
provision aims, among others, to permit the person who lost his prop-
erty, to recover it as far as possible. To withdraw professional findings
from the provision would be at variance with the provision’s purpose.
Therefore, the provision is in need of as wide a range of application as
possible.
Hartkamp, then, appeals to a systematic argument. Legal history
reveals that this provision can be conceived of as a particularization of
caretaking: The finder serves, as it were, as caretaker. If the legal pro-
vision concerning finding had not existed, the finder would have been
entitled to a reward in his capacity as caretaker. In order to be deemed
to be a caretaker, the law requires the caretaker to have acted profes-
sionally. Therefore, to exclude the professional finder from the provision,
as the claimant contended, would be contrary to the more generic pro-
vision of caretaking.
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Hartkamp ends his treatment with a linguistic argument. The claimant
argued that the decisive element in the concept of finding is the element
of chance; therefore, only the true finder, not the professional one, could
qualify as finder. This claim was rejected by Hartkamp, because the
professional finder is also subject to chance: Even when an object is
deliberatively looked for, one cannot be certain where it will be found.
If we return to the Court’s ruling, the Court simply states the alleged
intent of the provision. From this intent, the Court then infers that the
word “finding” could well be understood according to common parlance,
a reading that is the very interpretation the claimant seeks to contest.
Although the Court legitimizes the reading of this provision with an
appeal to linguistic interpretation, it is not because provisions always have
to be read “to the letter,” but because in this case a literal reading squares
with the alleged intent of the provision. That is a different way of saying
that the supremacy linguistic interpretation exerts in some cases is inti-
mately connected with other reasons to read a provision that way, and not
differently. Here, the role of the other reasons or perspectives is mainly
negative: For no reasons from legal history, the law’s system, legal prin-
ciples, or previous rulings could reasonably be advanced in favor of a
reading that challenges the reading as it appears from the perspective of
legislative intent. If no objections can reasonably be expected, it will not be
necessary to determine or justify the tenor of the provision also from these
perspectives. The linguistic argument suffices, because the reading squares
with the reading the other perspectives would result in.
The same holds for all methods of legal interpretation. Legislative intent,
although in this case decisive to determine the law’s purport, might be
overruled by different perspectives with an appeal to legal certainty,
efficiency, or a fundamental change in social opinions in other cases (e.g.,
HR 21 March 1986, NJ 1986, 585, about the provision concerning parental
authority). Neither linguistic interpretation, nor legislative intent or any
other variety of legal interpretation, is, as such, decisive in order to
determine the law’s tenor. In the heuristic phase, the judge passes through
the whole range of perspectives that might be relevant, although some of
them will be explored in depth and others will be passed over in silence.
6. Conclusion
We are now in a better position to expound why the claimants’ reading of
the provision of marriage was inadmissible as such: Their reading ignores
society’s traditional opinions on marriage, the institution that makes up
the nucleus of family life at the time of the enactment and, therefore, the
obvious context to understand this provision. Obvious, because this
reading is underpinned by all methods of interpretation, except one:
linguistic interpretation.
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The plaintiffs’ literal reading, then, is not a naive mode of reading, but
a sharp witted interpretation, in order to authorize by means of the judge
what couldn’t yet be found in the law. But this could only be done by
neglecting all sorts of counter-indications, or as the Supreme Court put it:
by a literal reading of the law that deviates from the unequivocal tenor of
the law.
These considerations result in the paradox that the plaintiffs, when
appealing to the letter of the law, interpreted the clear, plain and precise
provision—and interpreting is, according to Voltaire, nearly always cor-
rupting. By demanding that the judge be bound to the law to such a degree
as to always comply with the letter of the law, Montesquieu and Voltaire
did not want to express the idea that the law has to be understood
literally—whatever this could mean—but that the judge’s reading of the
law should comply with the reading that the normal speaker would ascribe
to it. This is only a slight variation on the Plain Meaning Approach of
Holmes and certainly not equivalent to a mere linguistic interpretation of
the law.
Actually, I do agree with Holmes’ Plain Meaning Approach. It means
that the judge, when interpreting the law, takes as a guideline the normal
speaker. It does not mean that the judge has to decide in accordance with
this reading of the law. The existence of compelling reasons sometimes
justifies a ruling contra legem. But the way to do so, is not by means of a
distorted reading of the law—a one-sided reading—but by appeal to
genuine reasons. In our case, the plaintiffs also appealed to the European
Convention on Human Rights (Rome, 1950) that guarantees the enjoyment
of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention without discrimi-
nation on any ground (Article 14 Convention). This article, together with
the right of men and women of marriageable age to marry and to found
a family (Article 12 Convention), offer, in my opinion, compelling reasons
to suspend the Dutch provision as it applies to same-sex marriage—
compelling, that is, as far as these articles are interpreted according to the
Plain Meaning Approach.
Interestingly, the Dutch Supreme Court defended a sharp-witted inter-
pretation of the Convention, one that makes it possible to discriminate
between sexual preferences. “In this Treaty,” the Supreme Court states, “the
right of men and women of marriageable age to marry and to start a family
concerns the traditional marriage. Therefore, the distinction between
heterosexual and homosexual couples is not inadmissible.” At the time the
Treaty was framed (1950), the states parties doubtless did not envisage a
social and moral development that would result in the demand that the
sacrosanct institution of marriage be open for homosexuals too. Yet, the
states parties expressly committed themselves to the recognition and
implementation of the human rights and freedoms, among them the
prohibition of discrimination on any ground. This is a mode of binding on
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government, especially when the exercise of these rights and freedoms leads
to results that the government rejects. For what is the relevance of the
human rights, if they can be restricted as soon as the government regards
their application, for some reason, inconvenient?
“Pacta sund servanda,” “a man a man, a word a word,” “to contracting
parties, agreements apply as law.” Like the plaintiff’s linguistic interpre-
tation of Article 33, book I, of the Dutch Civil Code, the Supreme Court’s
reading of the clear, plain, and precise provisions of the European Con-
vention is a sharp-witted one. One possible explanation for the Court’s
strained interpretation is that it enabled the Court not to declare itself
openly on a matter that was both politically and socially controversial at
the time of the ruling. The true reason for dismissing the request might be
found in the objection as adduced by the lower courts in this case: The
expunction of the ban on same-sex marriage by the judiciary would mean
“that the principle of marriage as a bond between man and woman only,
a principle firmly-embedded in the Western world for ages, would once
and for all be transformed out of democratic deliberation.” In so doing,
the judge would operate as legislator-deputy in cases that are explicitly
political in character. But rather than reach its decision by way of pseudo-
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